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EXECUTIVE BRIEF
By Mark Zandi, Steve Cochrane, 
Ryan Sweet, Ruth Stroppiana 
and Katrina Ell
U.S. trade policy and 
its impact on Asia.
Many of the trade policies of the United States 
President Donald Trump’s administration are aimed at 
addressing the perceived adverse impact of trade on the 
country’s manufacturing employment, and improving trade 
deals the President sees as not being in U.S. interests. These 
appear to be worthwhile goals, but crafting trade policy to 
address them is difficult. If not done correctly, the policy 
could do more harm than good for manufacturing and the 
broader economy, particularly if the U.S. implements 
more protectionist policies, or if its trading partners retaliate. 
The following article discusses the global economic impact 
of three different trade scenarios that illustrate how selected 
tariffs would have only a minor economic impact, but an 
all-out trade war with tariffs placed on all goods traded between 
the U.S. and China would have palpable consequences. 
Expected tariff scenario 
(50 percent probability)
The most recent salvo in the trade war is the U.S. decision to 
up the ante on the amount of Chinese imports to the U.S. 
subject to higher tariffs. The U.S. has imposed tariffs on 
US$311 billion in imported goods from China. Under this 
scenario, the assumption is that this is the fullest extent of 
the tariffs the U.S. imposes and that there is no further 
retaliation and only US$134 billion in U.S. exports are 
slapped with tariffs. 
If this is the extent of the tariff increases, then while not 
good for the U.S. and global economies, they will be able to 
largely shrug it off. We predict that U.S. real GDP will be 
reduced by just about 0.13 percentage point at the peak of 
the impact a year from now. More than 200,000 jobs will be 
lost over the period. The economic impacts outside of the 
U.S. will be comparable.
Cushioning the impact of the higher tariffs on the U.S. 
economy is the massive fiscal stimulus—deficit-financed tax 
cuts and government spending increases—that will pump up 
growth through to at least the middle of next year. For 
context, this stimulus is expected to add 0.4 percentage point 
to real GDP growth this year, and a like amount in 2019.
Mapping the economic consequences
Higher tariffs hurt the U.S. economy most directly and 
quickly through higher prices for imported goods. The tariffs 
act much like a tax increase, weakening the purchasing power 
of households—if households need to spend more on imported 
goods, they have less income to spend on other things.
Of course, exports also suffer as the tit-for-tat tariffs 
imposed on trading partners cause their consumers and 
businesses to purchase what they need domestically or from 
competing nations that can now provide the goods more cheaply. 
Chinese authorities have signiﬁ cant control over the economy 
and, in previous trade tiffs with Korea and Japan, have strongly 
recommended to their citizens not to buy the products of 
those countries. China has not gone down this path with the 
U.S. yet, but it is a credible possibility.
The higher tariffs also weigh on the profitability of 
multinationals and their stock prices. This occurs via a 
somewhat stronger U.S. dollar, as the trade tensions create a 
risk-off environment in global financial markets, and for 
U.S. companies, weaker overseas sales. The resulting 
flight-to-quality lifts the dollar’s value, which weighs on 
U.S. exports.
In the longer run, the reduction in trade weighs on 
productivity growth, as the beneﬁ ts of comparative advantage—
when nations specialise in what they are especially good at 
producing—and global competition are diminished. More 
broadly across Asia, the impact would be modest. In this 
scenario, China’s GDP growth is reduced by 0.03 percentage 
point in 2018 to 6.7 percent, and the brunt of the tariff 
impact will be felt in 2019 with GDP falling 0.09 percentage 
point below the no-tariff baseline to 6.3 percent. 
The tariff increases translate to lower demand for 
Chinese exports from the North American market. Exports 
remain a critical growth driver, comprising 20 percent 
of GDP. Reduced export revenues translate to lower 
manufacturing output, ﬂ owing through to weaker employment 
growth. The unemployment rate holds at baseline levels 
through 2023, but the relative stability masks weakness that 
sees consumption soften and drives down house price growth 
by 0.14 percentage point in 2019 to 2.8 percent. 
China’s stock market is the most sensitive metric examined 
under this scenario and reﬂ ects investors’ rising concerns about 
the implications of a trade war on China’s economy. While 
the stock market is not highly correlated with GDP, it is 
viewed as a decent barometer of sentiment. The rise in the 
FTSE Xinhua is estimated to be 1.16 percentage points 
lower at 4.6 percent in 2019. There is some recovery in 2020 
with the annual rise picking up to 6.3 percent, stronger than 
the 5.4 percent rise under the no-tariff baseline.
If this is the extent of the tariff increases between the 
U.S. and China, economies in Asia will not be immune to the 
trade skirmish, but the hit to GDP growth is negligible and 
forecast variables stay close to baseline levels. The hit to 
GDP growth largely comes from the export channel as Asia 
is an important provider of inputs for Chinese manufactured 
goods, particularly technology producers Malaysia, Singapore, 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, where technology products comprise 
a sizeable, if not the largest, share of exports. Based on a 
simulation of the Moody’s Analytics global model, which covers 
68 countries linked via trade ﬂ ows, foreign direct investment, 
and ﬁ nancial markets, real GDP growth in Asia is reduced by 
only 0.08 percentage point by 2019, with an even more 
negligible impact of around 0.02 percentage point in 2018. 
Reduced global trade flows drag on commodity prices 
and have a pronounced impact on commodity export-oriented 
countries such as Australia and Indonesia. China’s softer 
GDP path hurts iron ore prices, which remains Australia’s 
largest export, with China the largest export destination. 
Indonesia’s important commodity exports to China include 
coal, petroleum gas, and crude petroleum. 
A slowdown in regional demand will also hurt India’s 
petroleum-related exports. While India is a net oil importer, 
exports of refined petroleum products still account for a 
large part of export values. As regional demand slows, demand 
for refined products such as diesel, oils or other fuels is 
likely to drop. Moreover, chemical product and engineering 
goods exports will decelerate as demand in major export 
destinations such as the EU is likely to be lower.
The reworking of the global supply chain, when it occurs, 
will be highly disruptive, and is only partially picked up in 
our model. The manufacture of many goods involves multiple 
cross-border movements. Indeed, the U.S. trade deficit with 
China is signiﬁ cantly inﬂ ated, because China is simply where the 
final assembly of many components produced in Japan and 
elsewhere in Asia occurs. Higher tariffs change the economics 
of the supply chain. If the tariffs remain in place long enough, 
they will cause the chain to shift. 
Threatened tariff scenario 
(40 percent probability)
It appears increasingly likely that 
the trade war will escalate, given the 
rhetoric and the apparent lack of a 
clear path to resolution. This scenario 
assumes that all tariffs that the U.S. 
has threatened are implemented, 
including a 15 percent average tariff 
on US$800 billion in U.S. imports, 
and US$275 billion in vehicle imports 
subject to a 25 percent tariff. This 
scenario also assumes a 15 percent 
tariff on an additional US$475 billion 
of U.S. exports. If implemented, close 
to one-third of all imported goods into 
the U.S. will be subject to higher tariffs.
Assuming that impacted U.S. trading 
partners respond with in-kind tariffs 
on U.S. goods, the macroeconomic 
consequences would be more serious. Using 
our global model, such an escalation would 
reduce U.S. real GDP by 0.5 percentage 
point and employment by 700,000 jobs 
at its peak. This is still not enough to 
derail the ﬁ scal-stimulus-fuelled economic 
expansion, but it would be enough to be 
felt, particularly in the U.S. agricultural 
and manufacturing industries. 
In this trade war scenario, real GDP 
growth in Asia is reduced by around 
about 0.06 percentage point in 
Higher tariffs change the economics of the supply 
chain. If the tariffs remain in place long enough, 
they will cause the chain to shift.
2018 and 0.38 percentage point in 2019 before recovering in 2020 (refer to 
Figure 1). China’s GDP growth falls by 0.07 percentage point in 2018 to 
6.6 percent and is 0.42 percentage point below the no-tariff baseline in 2019 to 
5.95 percent. Annual GDP growth improves by 2020 with growth coming in 
0.24 percentage point above the projected no-tariff baseline growth rate 
at 6.1 percent. 
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FIGURE 1 Source: National statistical agencies, Moody’s Analytics
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FIGURE 3 Source: OECD, Moody's Analytics
The tariffs are like a hefty import 
tax, reducing demand for Chinese 
goods in the U.S. Other important 
markets, including Europe and Asia, 
are unable to sufficiently pick up the 
slack from weaker U.S. export demand. 
Tech products are an important 
focus of the U.S. tariffs on Chinese 
goods imports, and this takes the 
wind out of the global tech upswing 
that China has benefited from for over 
a year (refer to Figure 2).
The Chinese government has 
increased its fiscal and monetary 
stimulus (that it has already stepped 
up since the trade war escalated earlier 
this year), but these additional measures 
are insufficient to absorb the direct hit 
to GDP growth. Investors run for cover 
under this scenario, as reflected in the 
equity market being 5.29 percentage 
points below the no-tariff baseline 
in 2019 at just 0.49 percent, before 
partially recovering and rising to 
8.6 percent in 2020, 3.2 percentage 
points stronger than the baseline. Capital 
outflows are expected to accelerate 
under this scenario, but concentrated 
efforts should keep the Yuan broadly 
steady through the brunt of the scenario 
in 2019.
Under this scenario, Asia’s important 
integrated supply chains are strained, 
and this is where the hit to GDP 
growth largely comes for remaining 
countries, since they are not directly 
subject to the U.S. tariffs.
Examining the import content of 
exports illuminates the extent to which 
a country is a user of foreign inputs, 
and for most economies in Asia, this is 
relatively high (refer to Figure 3). Value-
added trade data from the Brookings 
Institution confirm that in the case 
of the ‘computers, electronic equipment’ 
category, there is more foreign 
value-added than domestic value-
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FIGURE 2 Source: China National Bureau of Statistics, Moody's Analytics
added in Chinese exports to the U.S. 
(Figure 4). In other words, technology 
intermediaries play a greater role in 
producing goods in this category that 
are shipped to the U.S. than China 
does. This is important because those 
economies that are important tech hubs 
throughout Asia, including Taiwan, 
Malaysia, Hong Kong and Singapore, 
inevitably suffer from tariffs on Chinese 
technology imports to the U.S. simply 
because of their role in the supply chain.
Under this scenario, the worst 
of the hit to GDP growth occurs in 
2019. Hong Kong’s GDP growth is 
reduced by 0.62 percentage point 
below baseline levels to 0.9 percent 
in 2019. Singapore’s GDP growth hits 
1.7 percent in 2019, 0.23 percentage 
point below the baseline. Malaysia 
endures a similar magnitude slump 
with annual GDP growth hitting 
3.95 percent under the scenario. 
Some Chinese parts that are 
currently shipped directly to the U.S. 
could be redirected via Southeast Asia 
to avoid tariffs, but whether this 
would be a boon for Southeast Asia 
in the near-term is unlikely, given 
that manufacturing is still taking 
place in China. In the medium to 
longer term, China could accelerate 
offshoring to some parts of Southeast 
Asia, where labour and operating 
costs are lower, but this would not 
be enough to offset the direct hit from 
lower trade flows. GDP growth in 
export-dependent Taiwan is expected 
to cool to 2.1 percent in 2019, 
0.35 percentage point below the no- 
tariff baseline as its heavy exposure 
to electronics makes it particularly 
vulnerable to this protectionist stance. 
The marked reduction in global 
trade flows sees commodity prices take 
a hit, with Brent oil falling to around 
US$60 per barrel by the end of 
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2019. Weaker commodity prices flow through to weaker export receipts for 
Australia and Indonesia. Australia’s GDP growth is reduced by 0.23 percentage 
point in 2019 to 2.5 percent, before returning to near the no-tariff baseline growth 
rate in 2020. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s GDP growth is 0.15 percentage point lower 
in 2019 at 4.62 percent, but by 2020 comes in at 5.0 percent, 0.41 percentage 
point above baseline.
Exchange rates in all countries except Hong Kong and Singapore act as a 
partial shock absorber, but are unable to completely absorb the hit to exports. 
Modest monetary easing comes into view for these Asian countries from 2018 
with policy rates not returning to no-tariff baseline levels until after 2023. 
Trade conflagration scenario (10 percent probability)
It would take a lot to derail the expansion, yet an across-the-board hike in tariffs 
on U.S.-China trade could do it. The U.S.-China trade relationship is the largest in 
the world, with Chinese exports to the U.S. running at more than US$520 billion 
per year—more than one-fifth of total U.S. imports. U.S. exports to China total 
more than US$130 billion—close to one-tenth of total U.S. exports.
A scenario that includes a 25 percent tariff on all this trade, coupled 
with Chinese ‘qualitative’ measures that complicate doing business in China 
for American companies, would overwhelm global economic expansion. China 
could take a range of qualitative steps, from more aggressive inspections of 
U.S. imports to stiffer visa requirements for visiting American workers, 
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to ensure that they match the economic pain created by 
the U.S. tariffs on their products.
In this scenario, the U.S. economy descends into recession 
by the second half of 2019. The increase in import prices 
and accelerating inflation and decline in exports would 
overwhelm U.S. expansion, particularly since the entire 
global economy and financial markets would also be reeling. 
Real GDP is cut by 1.8 percentage points at the economy’s 
nadir at the start of 2020, costing the economy almost 
2.6 million jobs. Unemployment rises to well over ﬁ ve percent. 
The rest of the global economy suffers, although a stronger 
U.S. dollar moderates the blow somewhat. The economic and 
political turmoil created by the trade war causes a sell-off in 
global financial markets and a risk-off environment. Global 
investors ﬂ ock to the safety of U.S. treasury bonds, resulting 
in an appreciation of the U.S. dollar against most other 
currencies, most notably vis-a-vis the Euro and the Yuan. 
Therefore, the Chinese economy ironically weathers the trade 
war storms more gracefully than the U.S. 
In this trade war scenario, real GDP growth in Asia is 
reduced by around 0.24 percentage point in 2018 and 
0.92 percentage point in 2019 before recovering modestly 
in 2020. In this scenario, China’s GDP growth drops by 
1.19 percentage points to 5.28 percent in 2019 and 
0.19 percentage point to 5.6 percent in 2020. The marked 
deterioration through 2020 causes significant reduction in 
manufacturing output, spilling over to weaker employment 
and income growth. Government stimulus steps up on both 
a fiscal and monetary front but is unable to materially help 
the economy get back on track and GDP growth stays below 
the no-tariff baseline level until 2021. 
China’s stock market falls sharply in this scenario, 
declining by 9.4 percent in 2019, and the Yuan remains 
below baseline levels through 2023, hitting a low of 6.5 per 
U.S. dollar in 2021. The weaker Yuan forces the current 
account surplus to narrow, acting as a secondary channel by 
which investors turn more bearish on China as they question 
the health of key economic metrics. 
Asia is swept up in the dire situation and important 
supply chains come under severe strain. Reduced global 
demand, coupled with the heightened inability to source 
key components, means that Asia’s technology producers 
have their otherwise upbeat growth trajectories knocked 
off course. Similar to the proposed tariff scenario, the worst 
of the hit to GDP growth occurs in 2019. Hong Kong’s 
GDP growth is reduced by 1.26 percentage points to 
0.3 percent in 2019. Singapore’s GDP growth slows to 
1.7 percent in 2019, 0.36 percentage point below baseline. 
Malaysia endures a similar magnitude slump with annual 
GDP growth slowing by 0.33 percentage point to 3.9 percent 
in 2019. Annual growth in Hong Kong and Singapore remains 
below the no-tariff baseline rate until 2021, while Malaysia 
returns to near baseline growth rates in 2020.
In all these Asian countries, China is their largest export 
partner, ensuring a high vulnerability to this scenario. An added 
hit comes from higher policy uncertainty, raising the cost of 
capital and causing businesses to delay hiring and investment. 
The resulting slump in wages weighs heavily on consumption.
Commodity producers are also not immune. Markedly 
reduced global demand drives down commodity prices, 
weakening an important source of income for Australia and 
Indonesia. In this trade conﬂ agration scenario, Brent oil falls 
to around US$51 per barrel by the end of 2019. Firms 
abandon investment plans and cut employment to try and stay 
aﬂ oat through the turmoil. The unemployment rate in Australia 
peaks at 5.3 percent in 2019. Indonesia’s unemployment rate 
rises to 5.2 percent in 2019, modestly higher than the baseline. 
Australia’s annual house price growth slumps to 
2.4 percent in 2019, weaker than the no-tariff baseline 
projection of 3.48 percent with the resulting weaker wealth 
effects providing a further hit to consumption. 
A broad-based slowdown in trade will cause India’s 
foreign direct investment (FDI) to fall. FDI remains a 
key source of funding for various Indian companies, 
and a slowdown in foreign flows means investment is 
likely to decelerate. Overall investment in India is already 
low, and a further slowdown will adversely impact the 
capital expenditure cycle. Less capital inflows will likely 
see the rupee depreciate, as the currency remains vulnerable 
to capital flight due to India’s high reliance on external 
funding. Although large unilateral trade sanctions are 
unlikely against India, there is a risk that the country could turn 
more protectionist. For example, India recently retaliated 
with its own tariffs against U.S. products in response to 
import duties on steel and aluminium imposed by the U.S. 
This will likely lower Indian imports, which could further 
hinder the capital expenditure cycle.
Equity markets are a decent barometer of the risk 
aversion that has swept through global ﬁ nancial markets, and 
large falls are recorded across all markets. Stock markets 
across the Asia-Pacific region will endure steep double-digit 
declines in 2019. Currencies fare similarly but are unable 
to fully absorb the hit to exports. 
An added hit of economic 
vulnerability comes from higher policy 
uncertainty, raising the cost of capital 
and causing businesses to delay 
hiring and investment.
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